Abstract-In recently proposed electricity markets, price-based competitive behaviours of power suppliers (i.e., generators), energy service providers and large users (i.e., consumers) have been formulated using various auction algorithms (see Post et al., 1995; Wolfram, 1998; Dekrajangpetch and Shebl, 2000; Nicolaisen et al., 2001; Swider and Weber, 2007) . In this paper, quantized Progressive Second Price (PSP) auction algorithms are presented for competitive electricity systems, especially for short-run electric power markets. In Jia and Caines (2008, 2010), two quantized PSP auction algorithms were introduced and analyzed for demand markets, which are called, respectively, the Aggressive-Defensive Quantized PSP (ADQ-PSP) algorithm and the Unique-limit Quantized PSP (UQ-PSP) algorithm. Here we first present an algorithm combined with ADQ-PSP and UQ-PSP features, and apply it to a double power auction system where competition on both power generators and energy service providers (and/or large users) is considered. Double auctions are formulated in this work as two single-sided quantized auctions which depend upon joint market quantities and price constraints. The extended algorithm inherits the performance properties of ADQ-PSP and UQ-PSP in terms of both the social welfare maximization and the rapid convergence rate.
INTRODUCTION
Pioneering electricity industry deregulations have been performed or considered in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Germany, America, to name but a few. The key motivation of such restructuring is to design efficiently decentralized rules in power systems to substitute for the traditional centralized regulation such that the true marginal costs of power generators (and/or large consumers) can be revealed by decentralized decisions, and in addition, social welfare will be improved by the competition among the agents. Consequentially, auction based methods (see Post et al., 1995; Wolfram, 1998; Dekrajangpetch and Shebl, 2000; Nicolaisen et al., 2001; Swider and Weber, 2007) have been applied as competitive and strategic pricing on such electricity system models.
Power auctions can be classified by different criteria: (i) based upon time periods and bid dimensions, centralized daily commitment ( power pool) auctions (see Madrigal and Quintana, 2001; and single period commodity auctions are applied in different countries; (ii) at the different stages of markets, wholesale auctions and retail auctions are separately considered; (iii) single-sided (Wolfram, 1998) and double-sided auctions (Nicolaisen et al., 2001) are exercised due to agents' market power; (iv) uniform and discriminatory pricings (Nicolaisen et al., 2001) are also adopted in these auction algorithms.
Here we focus on a single-period competitive electricity market model and mainly consider the competition among power suppliers (i.e., sellers) and energy service providers (and/or large users) (i.e., buyers). Quantized strategies for this model are established based upon our previous work on demand auctions (Jia et al., 2009; Jia and Caines, 2010) and the fact that quantization is meaningful in practice. As a result, the specified double-sided, uniform-pricing, open-bid, and iteratively dynamical auction is shown to have desirable properties: (i) acceptable pricing can be achieved simply and rapidly and (ii) the market participants (i.e., power generators, service providers and large users) have an incentive to ensure market efficiency.
In (Jia and Caines, 2010) , so-called Aggressive-Defensive Quantized Progressive Second Price (ADQ-PSP) auction algorithm and Unique-limit Quantized Progressive Second Price (UQ-PSP) auction algorithm were first presented for dynamic market-pricing in communication networks and social networks. These algorithms dynamically allocate a divisible resource to agents capable of exerting market power to generate successive price and quantity bids on the demand side. Subject to a quantization assumption on the bid price set, and considering agent populations with randomly distributed demand functions, it was proved in (Jia and Caines, 2010) that the nonlinear dynamics induced by the ADQ-PSP algorithm converges extremely rapidly with high probability to quantized (Nash) equilibria with a common price for all agents. On the other hand, the UQ-PSP algorithm was considered as a modification of ADQ-PSP in order to improve social efficiency but at the cost of a less rapid convergence rate; for this VCG-like algorithm, (i) the associated dynamical auction systems converge to a unique (e-Nash) equilibrium (i.e., independent of initial data); (ii) the limit resource allocation is efficient (in the sense of the optimization of the summed individual valuation functions) up to a quantized level under mild assumptions of demand functions.
In this paper we consider a double auction case, where agents (i.e., both sellers and buyers) in a power market are assumed to have market power, and their strategies not only influence their peers' behaviours but also influence the dynamics of the other side of the market (see Wilson, 1985; Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998, Luckock, 2003) . Each agent here is assumed to apply a quantized scheme derived from the features of the ADQ-PSP and UQ-PSP algorithms. Subject to this quantization assumption (a meaningful constraint, see Sotheby's, 2010) , the dynamical double auction system, consisting of recursive quantized bids and market information from both demand and supply sides, is shown to converge to an order-two orbit. The orbit consists of the two quantized prices defining the smallest price set approximating the competitive equilibrium price under the quantized framework. Social efficiency is hence achieved modulo to a quantized level.
This paper is organized as follows.
. In Section 2, we formulate the pricing of short-run competitive electric power market model as a progressive second price double auction. The public and private information in the market is clarified, and agents' utility functions are indicated according to the allocation rule and cost function. . Quantized strategies and the associated dynamical double auction system are established in Section 3. . The convergence and efficiency of such a system are then analyzed in Section 4. . Numerical simulations are given in Section 5. It is shown that the properties of rapid convergence and approximate efficiency of the algorithm help to restructure the daily or hourly electricity competition.
. Finally, we summarize our results in Section 6 together with some remarks concerning future research.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In our previous work (Jia and Caines, 2010) , it was assumed that sellers in the competitive demand market are price-taking and they do not influence the limit price of the dynamical demand auction. We will relax that assumption here and study an alternative situation where competitive behaviours on both the supply-side and the demand-side of the power market are considered. This problem is formulated as a double auction where both buyers and sellers make twodimensional bids simultaneously. Buyers and sellers recursively update their strategies to maximize their own utility by observing the current market information. In contrast to the single-sided auction, each buyer's (respectively, seller's) bid not only influences its opponents' behaviours, but also influences the dynamics on the supply (respectively, demand) side, and hence has an impact on the market total power quantity C and the lower-bound (respectively, upper-bound) of bid prices. Consistent with our overall theoretical framework and for practical meaningfulness, we retain the basic quantization assumption on bid prices. In this section, we first introduce the buyer and seller bidding profiles into one static model, and then present the notions of matched prices and quantities and potential quantity. Competition in the double auction will be formulated as two single-sided auctions which depend upon these joint market quantities and price constraints. That is to say, we describe such competition as a non-cooperative game and introduce the coupling parameters between both sides of the market in a static model. Next, in Section 3, we construct a dynamical quantized double auction system which consists of two coupled recursive subsystems.
Specifically, in a non-cooperative power market, N power suppliers (i.e., sellers) produce divisible electricity resource to satisfy the requirement of M large users (i.e., buyers). Each seller makes a two-dimensional bid s j ¼ ð ps j ; qs j Þ, 1 j N, to a market operator (auctioneer), where qs j is the quantity the seller desires to provide and ps j is the unit-price at which the seller wishes to sell qs j . Here we assume ps j p c , 1, for all 1 j N, where p c . 0 is defined to be a threshold price, i.e., the highest price the market can bear. Correspondingly, each buyer also makes a twodimensional bid b i ¼ ð pb i ; qb i Þ, 1 i M, to the market operator, where qb i is the quantity the buyer desires and pb i is the unit-price the buyer wishes to pay for qb i .
We define:
. . The buyer bid price function (BPF) is a right-continuous (i.e., continuous from the right) function defined to be:
i.e., a mapping from quantities q and bidding profiles b to prices p.
The seller bid price function (SPF) is a right-continuous function defined to be:
These two bid price functions are introduced in order to describe the public bidding information on both sides of a competitive market, which consist of the buyer bidding profile (ordered w.r.t. bid prices from high to low since the higher bid price for a buyer implies the higher priority to obtain the resource) and the seller bidding profile (ordered w.r.t. bid prices from low to high since the lower bid price for a seller implies the higher priority to sell the resource), respectively.
. The matched prices pb Ã and ps Ã are, respectively, the buyer bid price and the seller bid price such that
where q Ã ¼ sup q fBðq; bÞ ! Sðq; sÞg, i.e., the superior quantity such that the BPF function is not less than the SPF function. Buyers bidding a price higher than or equal to ps Ã and sellers bidding a price lower than or equal pb Ã are called matched agents (see Figure 1) . One may check that pb Ã ! ps Ã . Here the "matched" concept is applied in order to describe the relation between two competitive sides of the market. This notion delineates subsets of the sellers and the buyers (determined by the matched prices respectively) which can trade positive quantity of goods with each other. In this paper we assume that agents in the market are rational and therefore, they shall make strategic bids such that they are matched. The total potentially traded quantity is then analyzed in terms of the notion of matched quantities which are defined as follows. 
where B p is the bid price set, i.e., B p W f ps j ; 1 j Ng <f pb i ; 1 i Mg. Here C is specified in two different situations: (i) When the bid prices of the sellers do not agree with those of the buyers, i.e., pb Ã . ps Ã or pb Ã ¼ ps Ã and jB p j . 1, the total available quantity considered by both sides at the next iteration is chosen as the larger matched quantity. This assumption reflects the market potentiality for higher matched quantity level and it encourages more resource to be produced or required in the market before the agreement is achieved. (ii) When there exists a unique matched price, i.e., pb Ã ¼ ps Ã and jB p j ¼ 1, C is assumed to be the smaller accumulated bid quantity on both sides, which corresponds to the actual matched quantity if the auction stops at this iteration. Figure 1 describes the relationship between bid price functions (BPF and SPF) and matched information ( prices pb Ã ; ps Ã and quantity C). By introducing the matched quantities and prices, we can decompose the considered double-sided competition into two dependent dual subsystems: the progressive second price (PSP) supply auction and the progressive second price demand auction.
I. Competition among sellers (PSP supply auction)
. Given a potential quantity C, the seller market-price function (SMF) of Seller S j ; 1 j N, is a left-continuous function defined to be: Figure 1 . Public bid information in a quantized double auction which is interpreted as the maximum bid price the seller asks in order to supply the quantity q given the opponents' profile s Àj , the quantity C and the threshold price p c . The function is only meaningful for q . 0. Similarly we define its inverse function Qs j as follows:
which means the minimum supply quantity at a bid price of p given s Àj . . The private supply function s j : R þ ! R þ of Seller S j ; 1 j N, is non-decreasing and continuous. Here a supply function represents the amount of resource that a supplier prefers to sell at various prices (i.e., the marginal cost function in Green and Newbery, 1992) . Denote Y j ðqÞ ¼ Ð q 0 s j ðtÞdt; 1 j N, as the production cost function and I j ¼ s À1 j ; 1 j N, as the inverse supply function. The potential valuation function is defined to be V j ðqÞ ¼ p c Á q À Y j ðqÞ, 1 j N. It is noted that these functions are privately associated with S j , and are unknown to all the other agents and the auctioneer. For simplicity of analysis, in the following discussion, we assume that:
Hypothesis 2.1 (Elasticity Supply). Each s j satisfies an elasticity assumption: there exists
. The allocation rule for sellers is defined as follows:
where a j denotes the quantity Seller S j sells at a bid price ps j given the opponents' bidding profile s Àj , i.e., the minimum of S j 's bid quantity qs j and the available market quantity at the bid price ps j . The cost to S j shall include two parts: the production cost Y j ða j ðsÞÞ and the opportunity cost c j . c j is introduced based upon the concept of the exclusion compensation principle (Lazar and Semret, 1999) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Makowski and Ostroy, 1987) ; it represents the potential difference in revenue between that contributed by all the other sellers distinct from S j when (i) S j is absent from the auction and (ii) S j participates in the auction. The Progressive Second Price auction is named after this feature (Lazar and Semret, 1999) . . Seller S j 's utility is defined to be
i.e., the potential valuation minus the opportunity cost at the allocated quantity a j ðsÞ.
For the sake of simplicity, here we assume that the sellers (and buyers) in the market do not have budget constraints. Then given the opponents' bidding profile s Àj and the potential quantity C, the best reply (i.e., maximizing u j ðsÞ) of a seller under the framework above can be chosen as follows:
Lemma 2.2. Subject to Hypothesis 2.1, given s Àj and C, Seller S j 's best response is obtained by s j ¼ ðws j ; vs j Þ, where
The proof of Lemma 2.2 is similar to that presented in (Lazar and Semret, 1999) in which the dual problem on a demand-side auction is studied. Due to space constraints, we omit it here. It is noted that the best strategy ðws j ; vs j Þ is truth-telling, i.e., the bid is chosen truthfully according to s j .
The relationship between Seller S j 's supply function, its market price function and its best strategy given in (13) is shown in Figure 2 , where purely for simplicity of portrayal, it is assumed that s j is linear.
II. Competition among buyers (PSP demand auction, Lazar and Semret, 1999)
. The buyer market-price function (BMF) of Buyer B i , 1 i M, is defined as:
where C is determined by (7) and it was a fixed value for demand auctions in (Jia and Caines, 2010; Lazar and Figure 2. Market information and the best strategy Semret, 1999) . Its inverse function is:
. The private demand functions d i ðÁÞ : R þ ! R þ , 1 i M, of buyers are assumed to be decreasing and continuous.
as the inverse demand function and Z i ðqÞ ¼ Ð q 0 d i ðzÞ dz as the valuation (or reward) functions of buyers. The valuation function Z i and the demand function d i reflect the intrinsic value and marginal value of a certain amount of resource for a buyer B i , respectively. It is noted here that (i) these functions are privately associated with B i , and are unknown to all the other agents and the auctioneer and (ii) for convenience of reference, we assume that the demand function d i is a mapping from quantity q to price p and so it corresponds to the "inverse demand function" commonly used in economics literature (see, e.g., Samuelson and Marks, 2003; Krugman and Wells, 2005) .
Hypothesis 2.3. (Elasticity demand, Lazar and Semret, 1999) We assume that Z i ð0Þ ¼ 0, 1 i M, and for any
. The allocation rule (first presented in Tuffin, 2002) for buyers is then defined as follows:
where a i ðbÞ denotes the quantity Buyer B i obtains by a bid price pb i when the opponent buyers bid b Ài and the potential quantity is C, and the charge to Buyer B i is denoted as c i ðbÞ. . Buyer B i 's utility (Lazar and Semret, 1999 ) is defined to be
In a similar way, we can find buyers' static best strategies b i ¼ ðwb i ; vb i Þ, given b Ài and C,
which was first described in (Lazar and Semret, 1999) .
QUANTIZED STRATEGIES AND DYNAMICAL AUCTION SYSTEM
By using the definitions above, one may check that the strategies ðvs j ; ws j Þ, 1 j N; on the supply-side specified in Lemma 2.2 and the strategies ðvb i ; wb i Þ, 1 i M, on the demand-side given in (17) are still the best replies with respect to the given information fb; sg (and C(b, s)) (i.e., they are dominant strategies). In this section, we consider agents' behaviours in such a double(-sided) auction but subject to a quantized pricing constraint (that is to say, all agents' bid prices should be chosen from a finite price set B 0 p ). This is motivated by that fact that quantized pricing has many practical examples (see, e.g., Sotheby's, 2010) . For a quantized double auction, each agent (a buyer or seller) at each biding iteration makes a (quantized) strategic bid to maximize its own utility. Such rational strategies may not be unique. In the following we develop a family of quantized strategies and show that they are g-best replies subject to quantization. These strategies are extended from our previous work on the ADQ-PSP algorithm and the UQ-PSP algorithm (Jia and Caines, 2010) .
Quantized strategies for PSP double auctions: Given the bidding profiles fb, sg, the supply function s i , the potential quantity C ¼ C(b, s) and a quantized price set B 0 p , the quantized strategy s j ¼ ð ps j ; qs j Þ for Seller S j , 1 j N, is as follows: 
p max W max B 0 p , and ðvb i ; wb i Þ corresponds to the best strategy without quantization constraints.
A The key features of sellers' quantized strategies in the double auctions are as follows (and buyers' strategies are considered similarly):
(1) Eq. (18) specifies the upper-bound of sellers' bid prices, which should be less than p u ¼ min j f pb j ! ps Ã g, i.e., the minimum bid price of matched buyers (otherwise, zero utility results for an unmatched seller with a price greater than p u ).
(2) As presented in (19), when the aggregated supply is less than the potential quantity C, the sellers bid a defensive (higher) quantized price with respect to the best bid price ws j , but if the aggregated supply is greater than C, the agents bid an aggressive (lower) quantize price compared with ws j . This feature is inherited from both the ADQ-PSP algorithm and the UQ-PSP algorithm (Jia and Caines, 2010) .
Lemma 3.1. Subject to Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.3, the quantized strategies specified in (18) and (20) are truth-telling and optimal up to a quantized level.
Sketch of proof: The quantized strategies specified in (18) and (20) approximate the corresponding best replies up to a quantized level. The bid in (18) 
where ð p; p 0 Þ is a pair of adjacent quantized prices, we see that the strategy ð ps j ; qs j Þ is g-optimal. A similar argument applies on the demand side.
A This incentive-compatible property (i.e., a truth-telling strategy is dominant) is inherited from the VCG-like allocation rule (10)- (11) and (14)-(15). Lemma 3.1 implies that the strategies given in (18) and (20) are rational choices for agents in a quantized auction framework and therefore, we assume that Hypothesis 3.2 All agents in the double auctions specified in Section 2 apply the quantized strategies (18) and (20), respectively. Now we introduce the associated dynamical system for the considered double auction. Assume that all buyers and sellers do not have budget constraints and update their strategies simultaneously and recursively. Then given B 0 p , fs j g 1 j N and fd i g 1 i M , the recursive dynamical system for the double auction above consists of two subsystems:
Dynamical Quantized PSP double auction state-space system:
Buyer-side dynamical auction subsystem 
, and 0 k , 1.
CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the convergence property of the dynamical double auction system (23). First, we define two quantized price sets
The notation can be found in the example in Figure 1 (23), it can be shown that, in order to achieve positive utilities (i.e., match guaranteed), buyers' bid prices should be greater than or equal to sellers' bid prices, i.e., jN k p j ¼ 0 for all k ! 1 (see Claims (a) and (b) in the proof of Lemma 4.4). That is to say, all agents are matched after the first iteration and hence C k . 0 for all k ! 1.
(ii) Before an agreement is achieved, the potential quantity C k is chosen as the maximum of the matched quantities on both sides (based upon (7)) which consequentially increases the matched quantities in the next iteration under the condition jN 
This D-I price quantization hypothesis excludes the occurrence of a deadlock due to quantization.
Theorem 4.3. Subject to Hypotheses 3.2 and 4.2, for any initial bidding profile ðb 0 ; s 0 Þ such that C 0 . 0, the dynamical double auction system (23) converges at some k Ã , 1; to a non-trivial order-two orbit such that 
and are independent of the initial bidding profiles s 0 and b 0 .
In particular, if p
Þ, then the system converges to a unique limit quantized price.
Furthermore, subject to Hypotheses 2.1, 2.3 and 4.1, the order-two orbit approximates the social optimum up to a quantized level.
Sketch of proof: Based upon the assumptions on demand functions and supply functions, there exists a unique price p e satisfying X
which is called the competitive equilibrium price. Subject to Hypotheses 2.1, 2.3 and 4.1, the social welfare function (i.e., the summation of ( potential) valuation functions) is maximized at this equilibrium. One may check that p Ã 1 is the smallest quantized price in the initial bid price set B 0 p greater than p e , and p Ã 2 is the largest quantized price in B 0 p less than p e . In Lemma 4.4 we show that, subject to Hypothesis 3.2 and 4.2, the dynamical double auction system (23) will converge to an order-two orbit, where two limit adjacent prices satisfy (27) and (28), and the potential quantity C k converges to a unique value C Ã then. The special case where p
A Figure 3 demonstrates the approximate competitive equilibrium nature of the limit order-two orbit for the quantized double auction. (29) is independent of the initial bidding profiles s 0 and b 0 . One may check that, the minimum matched quantity C k min ¼ minfCb Ãk ; Cs Ãk g achieves the maximum value C Ã at p Ã , which also corresponds to the maximum possible social utility subject to the quantized bid price set B 0 p . On the other hand, if 
NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS OF POWER AUCTIONS
A simple toy model for a power system is presented here to illustrate the results in Section 4. Five numerical examples are shown for the competition occurring on both sides of a power market, where all agents are assumed to apply the quantized strategies specified in Hypothesis 3.2. We assume that N power generators in a power market compete to provide electricity resource for competition among M users. For simplicity of calculation, supply functions s i , 1 i N, are modelled as
Note here that the equation (31) is the derivative function of the "cost function", or the "marginal cost" discussed in work (Green and Newbery, 1992; Peng et al., 2003) . And demand functions d i , 1 i M, are similarly given as
Here a 1 À a 4 are design parameters. In the first example, we assume that N ¼ 1 and M ¼ 20, that is to say, a single seller is considered to provide electricity resource for 20 users. Different from the single-sided auctions analyzed in Jia and Caines, 2010 where C is fixed, here the total quantity C changes according to the buyers' bidding profile. The dynamical behaviours of the matched prices and potential quantity are shown in Figure 4 , which applies the data in Tables 1 and 2, In the second example, we assume that N ¼ 15 and M ¼ 1. The convergence property is shown in Figure 5 , which applies the data in Tables 3 and 4, Figures 7 and 8 are presented for two more examples. We can observe both the rapid convergence and the order-two oscillations, which correspond to the best quantized approximations (from top and from bottom) for p e , i.e., the prices associated with the competitive equilibria of the power markets. Also the convergence time for each example is less than the cardinality of the initial quantize price set, 30.
For all these simulations, we can observe the monotonic behaviours on matched prices pb Ãk and ps Ãk for some k ! 0, which correspond to Claim (d) 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel auction algorithm has been applied to competitive electric power markets, motivated by the fact that restructuring an efficient market-based pricing electricity system has been occurring around the world. Considering the situation where competition may appear on both sides of the power markets, we have formulated the pricing problem as a quantized progressive second price double auction. Quantized strategies for such a double auction have been developed based upon our previous work of the ADQ-PSP algorithm and the UQ-PSP algorithm in single-sided auctions. We have proved that the dynamical double auction system associated with these iteratively updated quantized strategies converges rapidly to an order-two orbit, independent of initial data. Moreover, subject to mild assumptions on demand functions and supply functions, the limit orbit approximates the social optimum up to a quantized level. So far, our work mainly focuses on the single-period competitive electricity market model. It is of interest and of potential value to apply the schemes developed in this paper to power pool auctions (see e.g., Madrigal and Quintana, 2001; ; in this case strategic behaviours of agents in a competitive multiple-period electricity market would be under consideration. (27) and (28)). The last step is to check that once all agents are in the order-two orbit, they will stay there for all the following iterations.
Define (7). As a result, all buyers will bid aggressively and choose p Ã 1 as their bid price at the (k þ 2)th iteration, but all sellers will still stay at p Ã 2 . Therefore, the dynamical auction system will oscillate between the two states (i.e., the state at the kth iteration and the state at the (k þ 1)th iteration) and C k converges. If C k min ¼ Cs k , the same result can be achieved.
Overall, since in every two iterations the upper bound (or the lower bound) of M k p decreases (or increases) one price level until the dynamics converge to the order-two orbit, the convergence time is bounded by 2jB 0 p j. Furthermore, in the worst case, jM 
, and by checking the quantized strategies defined in Hypothesis 3.2, we have all buyers and sellers will bid p e at the next iteration. Hence the system (23) converges to p e in this case.
